From Salal to Ratle, a series of constraints: Indus Waters Treaty and the cost of cooperation

While the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is often hailed as one of the most ‘successful’ international water-sharing agreements, a closer look at the disputes surrounding it tells a more sobering story. Rather than being a consistent triumph, India’s experience with the IWT reflects a history of delays, operational compromises, and prolonged constraints, often stretching over decades.

Salal Project: The First Major Dispute

The first major project under dispute was the 690 MW Salal hydroelectric project on the Chenab River in Reasi, Jammu and Kashmir. In 1968, as per treaty requirements, India submitted the project design to the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) for Pakistan’s review.
Pakistan raised several objections concerning the dam’s height, design, and diversion canals. Although India considered escalating the matter to the World Bank’s Neutral Expert mechanism, it eventually conceded to Pakistan’s demands, keen to maintain the spirit of the 1972 Shimla Agreement.
In 1978, India agreed to significant design modifications, including:

• Reduction in dam height
• Elimination of the operating pool
• Sealing of the crucial undersluices for sediment management

The Salal project was completed in 1987 but soon suffered from sedimentation problems. Without the under-sluices, the reservoir quickly turned into an elevated riverbed, and the project’s capacity fell to nearly 57%, severely impairing its efficiency and lifespan.

Kishanganga and Ratle Projects: Disputes Continue

The 330 MW Kishanganga project, launched in 2006, became the first project under the IWT to face arbitration at the Court of Arbitration (CoA). Pakistan objected to India’s water diversion from the Kishanganga (Neelum) River and moved the CoA in 2010.
The CoA’s 2013 ruling was a mixed outcome for India: it allowed the diversion but mandated a minimum downstream flow to Pakistan.
Dissatisfied, Pakistan sought further arbitration on Kishanganga’s design in 2016.
Simultaneously, Pakistan raised objections to the 850 MW Ratle project in 2012. In 2022, it initiated parallel proceedings at the World Bank, invoking both the CoA and Neutral Expert mechanisms. India opposed this dual-track approach and, for the first time, issued a formal notice to Pakistan on January 25, 2023, seeking treaty modification, followed by a second notice on August 30, 2024.

As of now, both Kishanganga and Ratle projects remain pending before the Neutral Expert.

Tulbul Project: A Dispute Left Unresolved

The second major dispute centred around the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, initiated by India in 1984 at the mouth of Wullar Lake on the Jhelum River.

Pakistan objected, claiming it constituted a ‘storage’ project prohibited under the IWT. It raised the issue with the PIC in 1986, and construction was halted in 1987.

Despite multiple rounds of bilateral discussions until 2006, the project’s viability eventually eroded. Faced with Pakistan’s persistent objections and broader diplomatic concerns, India effectively abandoned the Tulbul project, the longest unresolved dispute under the IWT.

Baglihar Project: A Case Taken to the World Bank

The 900 MW Baglihar hydroelectric project on the Chenab followed about a decade later. India served the mandatory prior notice to Pakistan in 1992, but objections soon surfaced, particularly concerning the gated spillways (added to prevent Salal-like sedimentation) and storage capacities.

Tensions escalated after India awarded a construction contract in 1999. Eventually, the matter was taken to the World Bank in 2005, where Raymond Lafitte was appointed as the Neutral Expert.

After extended proceedings, Lafitte’s 2007 ruling largely upheld India’s design, including the contentious gated spillways. The dispute was formally resolved in 2010.